Banditry in North-West Nigeria: The Background
The word covers a lot of ground — cattle rustling, mass abduction, illegal mining protection. The drivers are better documented than the solutions.
"Banditry" is an imprecise term for a real and specific problem: armed groups operating from forest bases across Nigeria's north-west, funded principally by kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling and protection of illegal mining.
This is a factual account of what is documented. It is not a prediction, and it does not attribute responsibility to any ethnic or religious group.
What the figures show
SBM Intelligence, in research published 28 August 2026 covering July 2025 to June 2026:
- 7,825 people abducted in 1,713 incidents nationally
- At least 1,142 killed
- ₦7.78 billion paid in ransom, up from ₦2.56 billion the previous year
- 93.7% of all abductees were in the north
- Zamfara alone: 236 incidents, 1,921 victims — about a quarter of the national total — and 92 mass abductions
- Sokoto: 76 mass abductions
- At least six victims were killed after a ransom had been paid
Separately, ADF reported 599 banditry incidents and 2,742 casualties in 2025 — nearly double 2024 — and 13,485 banditry-related deaths across the seven north-western states between 2010 and 2023.
Human Rights Watch, covering July 2024 to June 2025, recorded 2,938 kidnapped in the north-west, over 60% of national incidents: Zamfara 1,203, Kaduna 629, Katsina 566, Sokoto 358.
The ransom figure is the one to sit with. ₦7.78 billion paid in a single year is not a symptom of criminality — it is a business model with a revenue line.
What drives it
Researchers consistently identify the same cluster of factors. None of them alone explains the problem.
Illegal mining. Gold, copper and lithium extraction in Zamfara and neighbouring states operates largely outside regulation. Where valuable minerals are extracted informally, armed protection follows, and armed groups take a cut.
Arms availability. Weapons have entered through Sahelian trafficking routes and, in documented cases, through raids on state armouries.
Land and water competition. Long-standing friction between settled farmers and pastoralists over access to grazing land and water has, in places, escalated into organised armed conflict.
Governance vacuums. Large forest reserves and rural districts have effectively no permanent state presence — no police post, no functioning court, no reliable road. An estimated 30,000 armed group members operate across northern Nigeria's ungoverned areas.
Porous borders. Movement across the Sahel is largely unmonitored.
The blurring with jihadist groups
Groups such as Lakurawa sit uncomfortably between criminal and ideological categories. ADF has reported coordination between Boko Haram factions, ISWAP, al-Qaeda affiliates and JNIM with bandit networks.
This matters for how the problem is addressed. A purely criminal network can in principle be dismantled by policing, prosecution and cutting off ransom finance. A network with ideological backing, external supply and territorial ambition is a different problem requiring different tools. Treating one as the other has been a recurring failure.
Mass school abductions
Between 18 and 21 November 2025, mass abductions took place at schools in Kebbi and Niger states. Releases followed: 24 on 25 November, 100 on 8 December, and 130 on 21 December.
School abductions have a compounding effect beyond the immediate harm. Parents withdraw children, schools close, and the out-of-school population — already the largest in the world — grows further.
The spread
The geography is widening. Zamfara and Sokoto remain the epicentres, but incidents have been documented spreading into Kwara, Benue and Plateau.
What has been tried
Military operations, state-level negotiated amnesties, bans on motorcycle movement and market closures in affected areas, telecommunications shutdowns, and proscription of specific groups. Each has produced localised and temporary effect.
Negotiated settlements with armed groups have been particularly contested. Proponents argue they save lives in the immediate term. Critics argue they establish a precedent that violence is negotiable and finance the next round.
Frequently asked questions
Is banditry the same as the Boko Haram insurgency? No. The insurgency in the north-east is ideological and territorial. Banditry in the north-west is primarily economic. Documented coordination between them exists, but they are distinct phenomena.
Is paying ransom legal? Nigeria's Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 criminalises ransom payment. Enforcement against families who pay has been rare, and the practice is widespread.
Which state is worst affected? On the most recent figures, Zamfara — around a quarter of national abductions in the year to June 2026.
Sources
- Abduction and ransom figures, July 2025–June 2026 — SBM Intelligence via The Guardian Nigeria
- Incident and casualty data, drivers, armed group estimates — ADF Magazine, July 2026
- State-level kidnapping figures and school abductions — Human Rights Watch World Report 2026